Most models of how science works propose that competition between ideas contributes to the advancement of knowledge. Criticism of scientific work plays a part in facilitating such competition by exposing the strengths and weaknesses of rival explanations, encouraging debate, and suggesting alternatives. Nevertheless, not all criticism has equal value to the scientific process.
In a review of epidemiologic studies on fine particles and mortality that appeared recently in EHP, Gamble (1) charged that the two major studies on this topic (2,3) may have been compromised by bias, yet he offered no serious effort to evaluate the alleged errors with the same standards of rigor demanded of the original studies.
For example, in Gamble's (1) claim that the study findings are compromised by the ecologic fallacy, he failed to address two important issues. First, the major prospective studies of fine particles and mortality are not classical ecologic designs because only air pollution exposures Sedentary lifestyle was posited as another potential confounder; however, Gamble (1) presented no evidence to suggest that sufficient differences in sedentary lifestyle among the six cities could account for the observed particle/mortality association.
Gamble (1) when the mean of a group-level exposure variable has an effect on the individuallevel exposure. By this definition there will be ecologic bias whenever the ecologic exposure variable has an effect, and when there is also an individual-level exposure effect in addition to the ecologic exposure effect. Unmeasured individual-level exposure to PM2 from all sources can be several orders ofmagnitude higher than ambient PM2.5 concentrations (10) because of extensive exposure to unmeasured sources such as tobacco and indoor combustion. These individual-level exposures vary for individuals within the group and contribute to the individual-level risk. The additional effect of ambient exposure provides the group-level component that leads to ecologic bias.
The American Cancer Society (ACS) Study (4) and the Six Cities Study (3) suggest that an increase of about 20 pg/m3 PM235 results in a 20-30% increase in total mortality. I sought to test the consistency of these findings by comparing risk estimates based on group-level exposure estimates to those based on individual-level exposure to a similar but more thoroughly studied particulate (i.e., tobacco smoke). Applying the models developed in these studies to tobacco smoke, one can predict that a 20-pg/m3 difference in ambient PM2.5 between cities is too small to result in a measurable difference in overall mortality (6) . If this is true, the differences in mortality between cities may be due to causes other than differences in PM. Whether there is ecologic bias, exposure misdassification bias operating at the individual level, or uncontrolled bias from other sources, the tobacco analogy suggests that bias away from the null may be operating in these studies.
Loomis et al. suggest that the tobacco analogy presents "strong evidence of a supralinear dose-response relationship between particles and mortality." In order to fit the data, the degree of supralinearity would have to be enormous. In fact, an increase of 19.6 pg/m3 in ambient PM2.5
and an increase of 16,000 pg/m3 from smoking would have to both result in a similar 20-30% increased risk (Figure 1 ) It is not plausible that two increases in exposure, which differ by almost three orders of magnitude, would both produce the same response. A more plausible inference is that either the PM2.5 or the smoking risk estimates are in error. However, I would place more credence in the smoking relative risks (RRs) because smoking is measured at the individual rather than the group level, and the smoking RRs are compatible with a large body of literature. 
